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Abstract. Home purchase-sale prices have been widely modeled by several authors. Nonetheless, other values exist, such as 
home mortgage appraisal values, used by financial institutions, which have played a key role in the recent financial crisis. 
This article attempts to model the appraisal price of one m2 of residential properties obtained by 31 appraisal companies in 
Valencia (Spain). Mortgage appraisal values of 17 007 residential properties were used for this purpose. Spatial autocorrela-
tion was detected in both the data and residuals of the ordinary regression model, which justified using spatial regression 
models. Of the four employed models, the error model offered the best results. Significant differences were found among 
appraisal companies, which varied as much as 83% for some. Generally speaking, small appraisal companies obtained high-
er over-valuation percentages, which confirms their situation of weakness. The fact that over-valuations exist in mortgage 
securities is a high risk for a stable financial system.
Keywords: firm size, housing, mortgage, overvaluation, spatial.
Introduction
Valuations for residential properties imply obtaining the 
market value, and this information is neither observable 
nor hypothetical. Therefore, appraisal companies quite of-
ten pay attention to formerly valued prices, which often 
results in biased valuations (Tidwell & Gallimore, 2014). 
Specifically, behavioural research erupted in real-estate 
valuation research in the early 1990s. Klamer, Bakker, 
and Gruis (2017) provide a systematic review of empiri-
cal research on real-estate valuer judgements in the last 
30 years and analyzed 32 relevant papers. They define the 
appraiser’s bias as the deviation from valuation procedures 
established to process information. They indicate two bias 
types: intrapersonal and interpersonal. Interpersonal bi-
ases affect the relationship between the valuer and his/her 
client, and address the effects of client influence on valuer 
decision-making processes. Almost all the studies on in-
terpersonal bias are conducted by survey research, which 
has been preformed between 1996 and 2005 in the USA 
and Nigeria using sample particpants.
The potential factors that affect the client influence 
(Levy & Schuck, 1999) fall into four main categories: the 
characteristics of the individual or organization providing 
the service; the characteristics of the client (in particular, 
mortgage bankers as the primary sources of client pres-
sure, followed by commercial banks); external character-
istics, including the regulatory framework, professional 
criteria and current markets conditions; the characteristics 
of the service to be provided.
Baffour Awuah and Gyamfi-Yeboah (2017) exam-
ine the extent of variations in valuations and the effect 
of complex valuation tasks on the levels of variations in 
Ghana. Their study finds high levels of variations in the 
valuation opinions of 33.6–63% for archival data and sur-
vey data, respectively.
There could be four types of influence on the valuer 
(Levy & Schuck, 2005): expert power; information pow-
er; reward and coercitive power; procedural power. Ex-
pert power is particularly manifiested in those clients that 
are large corporations and is materialized in knowledge 
about valuation processes and the client’s participation in 
the market.
Amidu and Aluko (2007) quantitatively compared the 
factors set out by Levy and Schuck (1999) about valuers 
in Nigeria. The results they obtained by holding inter-
views quantitatively confirmed that pointed out by Levy 
and Schuck in general lines. The most important influence 
factors were the integrity of either the valuer or of the 
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valuation company, the importance of the valuation result 
for the client, and the client’s size. However, the statisti-
cal tests found no relationship linking the society’s size, 
experience, level of training and perceiving clients’ relative 
importance.
Along these lines, Gallimore and Wolverton (2000) 
analyzed the influence that a client’s opinion has on mort-
gage valuations in the UK (which they previously did in 
the USA) to determine whether the objectiveness of the 
valuation from the established procedures used to calcu-
late the value predominates, or if the valuer certifies the 
agreed buying/selling price. Unlike the results obtained in 
the USA, in the UK no adaptation to the customer’s inter-
ests was noticed in the valuations of mortgage securities.
This in turn favors an increase in turnover and in the 
number of assignments with suppliers-appraisers that ac-
cept the guidelines (normally increases in the value, or at 
least easing valuations), although it could even imply re-
duced values, depending on the circumstances; this occurs 
with fund managers to be able to subsequently increase 
values gradually and to ensure that portfolios maintain a 
constant profitability (Levy & Schuck, 1999).
Crosby, Lizieri, and McAllister (2010) analyzed ap-
praisers’ different behaviors depending on whether prop-
erty funds on which they made valuations were open or 
closed. For the former, these authors observed a clearly in-
centive to make “downward” valuations because, in many 
cases, the funds only had access to liquidity by selling as-
sets. Thus in any case, market values had to be compared 
with sales periodically, and managers did not desire any 
very brusque movements, which was the opposite to what 
occurred with close funds for which there was no need to 
make sales in the same way.
Hordijk and Van de Ridder (2005) analyzed the meth-
odology that uses appraisers in the Netherlands to check 
if they fulfill valuation regulations, and if consistency and 
uniformity actually exist between valuation models, and 
what their variation is.
Valuation methods quite often neglect the inclusion 
of the real-estate market’s natural cyclic behavior, espe-
cially in non transparent markets with very few transac-
tions. This could be one of the factors behind the property 
bubble and the subsequent crisis that financial markets 
recently experienced. Hence it is important that the valu-
ation methodology underlines sustainability over time, es-
pecially with the valuations required to grant loans with 
a mortgage guarantee. What is more, the recent property 
boom (Agnello & Schuknecht, 2011) has been the longest 
in the last four decades, and suggests that the credits of-
fered to families could have significantly influenced the 
rises and falls in housing prices during the 1980–2007 
period. Cerruti, Dagher, and Dell’Ariccia (2017) also ob-
served a close dynamic relation between home credit and 
a rise in housing prices.
Some works have centered on comparing valuations 
of residential properties with home purchase-sale prices. 
Chinloy, Cho, and Megbolugbe (1997) observed some 
systematically higher valuations than purchasing data 
throughout the 1975–1993 period. Conversely, Cho and 
Megbolugbe (1996) found that valuations were lower in 
80% of cases, while appraisal and transaction prices were 
identical in 30% of cases.
When appraisal values are above the hedonic estima-
tions of housing values, they increase the risk of a mort-
gage not being paid. So, it is important to develop quality 
appraisal measures that impact the corresponding mort-
gage loan (Lacour-Little & Malpezzi, 2003).
Bowcock (2015) pointed out that mortgage valuations 
impacted the level of housing prices during the property 
bubble period from 2000 to 2008, which considerably con-
tributed to the recession that followed, which was much 
less inferior than in those which occurred in 1972 and 
1990. Despite the International Monetary fund’s warning 
in 2004 about prices being too high and home purchas-
ers having to be very careful, no basic research into the 
contribution made by those responsible for mortgage 
valuations appears to have been conducted. Agnello and 
Schuknecht (2011) stated that the deregulation of finan-
cial markets considerably reinforced the impact that the 
national financial sector had on booms appearing.
Moreover, mass valuation hedonic models are fre-
quently used in mortgage valuations to offer a rapid 
service and to cut costs. In such models, geographic in-
formation systems (GIS) technology can be very useful 
in financing mortgages and in related industries (Belsky, 
Can, & Megbolugbe, 1998). Indeed the higher potential 
contribution of GIS may be managing credit risks, prop-
erty and agencies, marketing, complying with regulations 
and R&D. Initially, the vast majority of existing applica-
tions were based, to a great extent, on managing spatial 
databases and map support functions, and barely any 
emphasis was placed on their analytical spatial capaci-
ties. Nonetheless, the applications of prototypes and R&D 
applications were recently based on spatial statistics and 
spatial econometric modeling.
Due to the recent peak in and burst of US landed es-
tate, the refinement and a more in-depth understanding 
of the methods used to value landed estate have become 
dire concerns of a series of broad academic fields related 
with the city. One of the main trends in the real-estate 
valuation field is expanding spatial econometrics (Krause 
& Bitter, 2012).
The existence of spatial dependence in the real-estate 
sector, i.e., values of properties are interdependent as re-
gards the nearest properties, is a frequently found circum-
stance in the real-estate market domain. This means that 
it is necessary to analyse whether this dependence arises 
in the analyzed spatial setting; if this spatial dependence 
exists, then it is absolutely necessary to measure the effect 
of this dependence on the explained variable.
Spatial hedonic models based on spatial econometrics 
date back to the studies presented in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Dubin (1998) developed a spatial hedonic regression mod-
el by including spatially autocorrelated error terms. Anse-
lin (1988) indicated that there are two main causes for 
spatial autocorrelation. On the other hand, through errors 
302 N. Guadalajara, M. A. López. The inflated valuation problem in Valencia, Spain, and implications for firm size
of different kinds: imperfect data, mismatches between the 
area and the phenomenon that is being explained. Belsky 
et al. (1998) reviewed GIS and possibilities of using them 
in mortgage financing and risk management, commercial-
ization, complying with the regulation, and in R&D. Can 
(1990, 1992) also developed spatial aspects by including 
two questions: the contiguity effect and the neighborhood 
effect. She observed that the conventional autoregressive 
model was superior to classic hedonic models as they re-
flect the spatial effects of proximity with other factors that 
are located close to the property.
Many works have applied a spatial analysis to the real-
estate market (Affuso, Cummings, & Le, 2017; Borst & 
McCluskey, 2007; Brasington, 2004; Chegut, Eichholtz, & 
Rodrigues, 2015; Zhang, Du, Geng, Liu, & Huang, 2015).
The most direct procedure to determine the level of 
over-valuing appraisal values consists in comparing these 
values with the price of each property (Chinloy et  al., 
1997; Lacour-Little & Malpezzi, 2003). Yet more often 
than not, this is not possible because in many countries 
like Spain, information about the transaction price of each 
property is not public information. Therefore, an alterna-
tive would be to estimate the level of prices using hedonic 
models and spatial models, which would include appraisal 
companies as factors that could influence the property’s 
mortgage value. In this way, it is possible to quantify the 
influence it has on the estimated price, and on the com-
pany that did the appraisal, and to determine how much 
this value increases depending on which company val-
ued, and to also homogeneously compare the differences 
among several companies.
For all these reasons, the present works aims to model 
the mortgage appraisal values of residential properties in 
Spain to analyze the influence that appraisal companies 
can have on these values, and to determine if there are any 
significant differences among them. This work is arranged 
in the following sections: Section 1 explains the situation 
in Spain and its mortgage appraisal company model. Sec-
tion 2 describes the methodology and information sources 
used. Section 3 and Section 4 provides the results and the 
discussion, respectively. Finally, the last section presents 
the conclusions.
1. The situation in Spain
Spain has gone through a major economic crisis during the 
2008–2014 period, and the real-estate sector has played a 
crucial role in its origin. In the 15 years running up to the 
crisis (1996–2008) (Aspachs-Bracons & Rabanal, 2010), 
Spain witnessed a huge increase in residential property 
prices, and the importance of the construction sector for 
the Spanish economy as it grew to reach 10% of the GDP. 
This has sparked debate about drivers of property cycles.
Ever since Spain joined the European Monetary Union, 
two major factors could lie behind the peak in residential 
properties: lower nominal interest rates due to premiums for 
risk of currencies disappearing, demographic factors related 
to immigration and changes in compositions of homes.
Jimeno and Santos (2014) deal with three main charac-
teristics of the Spanish economy during the period before 
the crisis began:
1) An economic activity that became increasingly 
more biased toward construction, the real-estate 
sector and other non marketable sectors.
2) A bank system capable of covering the huge in-
crease in credit demanded by homes and companies 
at a time when interests were really low, with exces-
sive optimism about growth, plus genuine facilities 
in employing real assets to back loans.
3) The external financing resources that led to an un-
paralleled increase in liabilities compared to the rest 
of the world.
In the center of this real-estate/financing hurricane, 
appraisal companies are found as those, which officially 
certify, in mortgage terms, values that have brusquely 
moved. They have been messengers that swiftly notified 
good news, and the necessary scapegoat to clean up any 
committed excesses.
For the appraisal values of properties to be considered 
valid in regulation terms, in Spain appraisals have to be 
made by appraisal companies that have been officially rec-
ognized by the Bank of Spain (Royal Decree 775/1997) 
by following a legally established methodology and report 
model (Ministerial Order ECO/805/2003).
Hence these appraisal companies’ independence has 
been questioned by public opinion in recent years. Some 
studies conducted in Spain (García Montalvo, 2009; Akin, 
Montalvo, Garcia Villar, Peydro, & Raya, 2014) state that 
appraisals values increased by around 29%. These rising 
rates were motivated by the loan-value ratio not exceeding 
maximum levels, generally 80% of the value of securities, 
to comply with regulation-based bank demands.
It is worth considering if these practices still exist in 
Spain in the post-crisis era and, as a novel aspect, if all 
stakeholders respond similarly to possible incentives and 
pressures so that the valued value exceeds the market price.
What all this has led to is that since 2013,1 a series 
of successive legal reforms have taken place to guarantee 
appraisal companies’ independence in order to promote 
quality and transparent valuations, which do not escape 
being classified as being somewhat populist. The possibil-
ity of a bank being the owner of an appraisal company has 
practically been eliminated (it is interesting to note that 
the figure of the credit company’s (the bank) internal ap-
praisal service still remains theoretically, but not in prac-
tice), independence-reinforced mechanisms have been set 
up when faced with banks or other real-estate operators, 
and it is compulsory (in certain cases) to apply genuine 
Anglo-Saxon style codes of conduct.
Real-estate valuations form a fundamental part of 
valuing financial risks (it is not in vain that over 60% of 
bank assets are collateralized with properties) thus, as 
1 See Art. 4 of Law 1/2013, of 14 May, on the measures to rein-
force the protection of mortgage debtors, debt rearrangement 
and social rents.
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mitigators of the risk, their value affects capital requests, 
and the amount of losses foreseen for credit risks.
The bases of our valuation model, which was outlined 
during years of democracy, comprise four basic parts:
a) A specific valuation methodology exists, set out by 
Ministerial Order ECO/805/2003. This order regulates the 
report model and the methodology to be applied for cer-
tain purposes: mortgage security of the credits or loans 
that form, or will form, part of the portfolio cover of 
mortgage bonds; determining the reasonable value of as-
sets into which the technical reserves of insurance and re-
insurance companies materialize; determining the wealth 
of collective real-estate investment institutions; determin-
ing the real-estate wealth of Pension Trusts.
b) A societal valuation model exists. The professional 
valuer figure is a key figure in this activity being exercised, 
but a society contributes the technical means, homogeni-
zation and quality control for any work done individually.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the last real-estate 
cycle. In 2006 the figure of 1.8 million valuations was 
reached (4% of the population), and the level of mort-
gages was similar. These figures drastically dropped to 
slightly over 300,000 mortgages (0.6% of the population) 
and to 661,000 valuations in 2013. When the bubble 
peaked, almost 80% of the valuations made correspond-
ed to a residential property, but they fell below 60% in 
2014. More valuations than mortgages were seen from 
2010, due fundamentally to the valuations of the stock 
of residential properties appropriated by the bank to pay 
off debts.
In the current cycle phase with less activity, it is easier 
to establish suitable control mechanisms so that the typi-
cal imbalances of peak phases do not take place because 
such a situation might end up transferring problems to 
the financial system with the devastating effects that we 
all know only too well.
c) An extensive in-depth report model exists.
d) The 36 appraisal companies officially recognized in 
2017 are registered and supervised by the Bank of Spain. 
Their administrative system, which intends to promote 
quality transparent valuations, is set out in Royal Decree, 
775/1997, of 30 May 1997.
Nonetheless, this model has the following weak points:
a) The shares-based dependence of credit companies 
or other stakeholders in the sector: although the number 
of shares-dependent companies has considerably lowered 
in recent years, it was necessary to set up a strict inde-
pendence regime between the company that valued loan 
securities and the credit company that loaned them. The 
2013 reform2 does not allow a bank or banking group to 
hold more than 10% of a given appraisal company’s capital.
b) Commercial dependence as regards credit compa-
nies: commercial dependence has been stressed by the 
number of credit companies lowering. Consequently, the 
2013 reform established a set of reinforced independence 
requirements3, which basically consist in establishing a 
code of conduct that affects shareholders and groups of 
interest; e.g., credit companies.
c) A high concentration in the sector, with a large 
number of small-sized appraisal companies which find it 
increasingly difficult to find mortgage business opportu-
nities. This would place them in a weak position as this 
situation could affect technical aspects and independence.
2 Law 1/2013, of 14 May; Ref. BOE-A-2013-5073.
3 This law establishes that “appraisal companies whose total income 
derives … at least 10 percent of their business relation with a credit 
company, or with the series of credit companies of the same group, 
should, provided that some of these credit companies have issued, and 
have in circulation, mortgage bonds, have the suitable mechanisms 
to favor the independence of appraisal activity, and to avoid conflicts 
of interest, particularly with managers or units of credit companies 
which, without having any specific competences in risk analyses or 
management, are related with the awarding or commercialization of 
mortgage credits or loans. These mechanisms shall consist in at least 
one internal conduct regulation that establishes the incompatibilities 
of their managers and administrators… The obligation of having these 
mechanisms will also affect … those appraisal companies in which 
shareholders have a significant influence, and who have specific inter-
ests either in promoting or commercializing properties, or activities 
which, as the Bank of Spain sees it, are similar in nature”.
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Figure 1. Evolution of mortgage activity and valuations in Spain
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d) A credit company adversely selecting an appraisal 
company.
e) A non transparent real-estate market. Public in-
formation about transaction prices, stocks of residential 
properties, buildings that have begun to be built, number 
of purchase-sales, and other data on such activity is quite 
scarce, inaccurate, but is gradually improving.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Materials
We obtained 26 140 valuations of multifamily residential 
properties in the Province of Valencia (east Spain), made 
in 2015 by 31 Spanish appraisal companies according to 
the requirements set out for the information contained in 
Ministerial Order ECO/805/2003, about rules of valuing 
properties and certain rights for some financial purposes. 
This information cannot be accessed by the general public 
and has been provided by the 31 appraisal companies to 
specifically conduct this study 4.
Valencia has selected for its characteristics: the capital 
is one of the most popular cities in Spain. The coast is a 
very tourist area. Inside the province we can find medium-
sized cities and small villages. The Province of Valencia is 
on the east coast of Spain and covers 10 763 km2, 644 km 
of which are coastline. It has a population of 2578.719 
inhabitants (INE 2011; INE = Spanish National Statistics 
Institute) and 266 municipalities. It borders the Mediter-
ranean Sea to the east.
In 2007, 70% of the inhabitants in the province 
(1738.690) lived in the metropolitan area of its capital, the 
city of Valencia. The 2011 census of residential properties 
indicated 1452.545 such properties, which represents an 
average of 1.8 inhabitants per residential property.
Of the initial 26 140 valuations, 9031 were eliminated 
because they corresponded to dwellings in one same build-
ing and were valued by the same company. Their values 
were replaced with their average value. Nor did we con-
sider the values of those properties valued at more than 
1M € (38 properties), or those whose value went below 
€10000 (64 properties) as they were considered atypical 
values. As a result, the database employed for the analysis 
contained 17 007 records.
For each property, information about the name of the 
company that made the appraisal was available (namely 
S01 to S31). Since 10 such companies had made fewer 
than 75 appraisals, they were included as one group. Con-
sequently, 21 appraisal companies were analyzed plus the 
one group (SRES) formed by the 10 companies, which re-
sulted in 22 appraisal companies variables. This enabled 
us to see whether those companies that made a few valu-
ations showed differential values to the rest.
4 For confidentiality reasons we cannot identify the appraisal compa-
nies. All the processed data are anonymous, and personal information 
(e.g. names of owners, location of houses, etc.) is never mentioned in 
the data set.
The appraisal company provided the appraisal value 
of the dwelling and its intrinsic characteristics. Socio-
economic information was also collected from INE, us-
ing census data of people and dwellings as 1 km2 grids. 
The 1 km2 grid used to disseminate information was that 
established by Eurostat. Information was facilitated only 
for those 1 km2 grids that contained at least one (main or 
second) dwelling.
Moreover, the geographic x and y coordinates of each 
dwelling were known, required to apply spatial models. 
With this information, distances to the city center or the 
coastline were calculated. Distance to the city center was 
geometrically acquired by transforming coordinates deci-
mal grades into meters. Distance to the coastline was ob-
tained with the ArcMap software. As the location variable, 
access to the tram system that connects towns with the 
city was also included. Table 1 shows variable definitions, 
sources and means.
Table 1. Variable definitions, means and SD
Variable 
name Definition Mean SD
VINM Total appraisal value for 
a multifamily residential 
property (€)
102664 78614
ANT_C Age corrected by all-round 
alteration works (years)
34 21
SADO Surface area taken by the 
appraiser (m2)
105 35
COST Construction costs estimated 
by the appraiser (€/m2)
551 125
NUBA Number of bathrooms 1.61 0.59
NUDO Number of bedrooms 1.62 0.61
CALI Construction quality; values 
from 4 to 1 (worse to better)
3.01 1.19
CONS Conservation status of the 
dwelling; values from 4 to 1 
(worse to better)
2.62 1.28
MCTC Surface area of covered 
terrace (m2)
1.93 5.41
MCTD Surface area of uncovered 
terrace (m2)
1.92 7.36
NPLA Number of storeys 4.84 2.26
IZVE 1 if a property has green 
spaces (7% of flats)
0.07 0.25
IPIS 1 if a property has a 
swimming pool (9% of flats)
0.09 0.29
ICAL 1 if a property has heating 
(24% of flats)
0.24 0.43
IAIR 1 if a property has air 
conditioning (36% of flats)
0.36 0.48
IASC 1 if a property has an 
elevator (71% of flats)
0.71 0.45
NGAR 1 if a property has a parking 
place (3% of flats)
0.03 0.18
IECO: 1 if is normative, and 0 
otherwise
0.78 0.42
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Variable 
name Definition Mean SD
PEXN Percentage of the foreign 
population born in Africa, 
Central America, South 
America, Asia, the Carib-
bean and Oceania
0.06 0.04
PEXE Percentage of the foreign 
residents population that is 
European
0.04 0.04
NEALT Percentage of residents with 
a high level of education
0.48 0.07
VVAC Percentage of empty dwellings 0.13 0.06
HAVI Number of people per dwelling 1.03 0.24
ALQ Percentage of rented dwellings 0.07 0.04
C1 City center < 0.5 km (1% of 
flats)
0.01 0.10
C2: City center < 2 km and > 
0.5 km (14% of flats)
0.14 0.34
P1: Less than 100 m to the beach 
(2% of flats)
0.02 0.13
P2: Less than 2 km to the beach 
> 100 m (10% of flats)
0.10 0.29
D1_
REN
Less than 1 km to a tram 
station
0.67 0.47
D2_
REN
Less than 2 km to a tram 
station
0.12 0.33
S01 a 
S31
1 if the appraisal was 
done by a company that 
performed >75 houses
SRES 1 if the appraisal was done 
by a company in the group 
of 10 smaller companies
N Number of observations 17,007
2.2. Methods
Consistently with the literature (Affuso et al., 2017; Bras-
ington, 2004; Chegut et  al., 2015), we used a hedonic 
model to examine the relationships between the appraisal 
value and the analyzed characteristics:
y = 
1 1
     
N M
i i j jX Dα + β + γ +ε∑ ∑ , (1)
where: y – property value in €; Xi – continuous variables; 
Dj  – dichotomous variables; N  – number of continuous 
variables; M – number of dichotomous variables; ε – error.
We assumed that the appraisal value was in accordance 
with the intrinsic property characteristics, neighborhood 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics, distance 
to city center and the coastline, the company that made 
the appraisal and the spatial process.
The tests to analyze the autocorrelation, normality 
and heteroskedasticity of the hedonic models estimated 
by OLS were: Durbin-Watson, Jarque-Bera and Breusch-
Pagan.
Whether spatial dependence existed was determined 
by Moran’s I Index (Moran, 1950) and by Lagrange Multi-
plier (LM), by applying different spatial weights: distance, 
contiguity and k-nearest neighbors (KNN).
Spatial models were determined in a second step:
 – The spatial lag model (SLM):
y =    Wy X D uα +ρ + β+ γ+  (2)
u ~N ( 0, 2 )nIσ ,
where: ρ  – coefficient of spatial correlation; W– standard-
ized spatial matrix; u – spatial error.
 – The spatial error model (SEM):
 y X D u= α + β+ γ + , (3)
where errors matrix u follows a spatial autoregressive re-
gression (SAR) process.
  u Wu=λ +ε , (4)
where: λ – coefficient of residuals spatial correlation; ε – 
idiosyncratic errors matrix.
According to Anselin (1998), the estimation of mod-
els SLM and SEM cannot be done by OLS as this estima-
tion would be inconsistent and/or inefficient, depending 
on the case. As a result, alternative methodologies of two 
types were sought: the first is maximum likelihood (ML) 
(Anselin, 1988), which is based on the hypothesis of the 
normality, independence and identically distributed er-
ror u term. One estimation by ML is based on strong as-
sumptions which, if fulfilled, confer the model optimum 
properties (e.g., consistency and asymptotic efficiency); if 
these assumptions are violated, these optimum properties 
are lost. Therefore, heteroskedasticity cannot appear. The 
second methodological alternative to estimate models is 
generalized moments (GMM) (Kelejian & Prucha, 1999), 
which does not require the normality assumption.
We use the adjusted (R2 adjusted) determination co-
efficient and Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) to test 
several functional forms for the hedonic price equation 
and the selected variables, and in models SLM and SEM 
by ML. The Student’s t-test was also run with the coef-
ficients of all the variables. In the models SLM and SEM 
estimated by the GMM, Spatial pseudo R2 was used, which 
is the approximate R2 estimation.
Spatial weights matrix W was obtained with distance 
and contiguity was symmetric, but not in the k-nearest 
neighbors case. This can be a problem when it is applied to 
the spatial models by ML. However, it is possible to obtain 
spatial models by applying non symmetric matrices in the 
GMM (Anselin, 1998; Kelejian & Prucha, 1999).
 – The spatial lag and error model (SLM-SEM).
The reason for this model lies in the circumstance that 
after estimating the SAR model, the spatial autocorrelation 
of residuals continued to appear (e.g., measured by Mo-
ran’s I). So it was easier to eliminate this autocorrelation 
by jointly applying SLM and SEM.
The reduced error process (4) form is as follows:
( ) 1   u I W −= − λ ε . (5)
If we substitute (5) in (2), we obtain:
y = ( ) 1
1 1
       
N M
i i j jWy X D I W
−
α +ρ + β + γ + −λ ε∑ ∑
End of Table 1
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( ) 1
1 1
      
N M
i i j jy Wy X D I W
−
−ρ = α + β + γ + −λ ε∑ ∑ . (6)
By multiplying both sides of the equation by ( )I W−λ , 
we obtain:
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
1 1
 y
   
N M
i i j j
y I W Wy W
X I W D I W
= α −λ + λ +ρ −λρ +
β −λ + γ − λ + ε∑ ∑ . (7)
A problem arises with terms  and λ ρ  as they have no 
single solution because they are summed and multiplied 
to one another in the same formula.
The model is solved in exactly the same way as in 
the SEM case, with the only difference being that it con-
tains endogenous variables 2y,     W−λρ
1
 
N
i iW X−λ β∑  and  
1
 –  
M
j jW Dλ γ∑ .
To calculate the parameters, first the generalized spa-
tial two-phased least-squared estimator method (GS2SLS) 
was applied to estimate ρ and the GMM to estimate λ.
If the normality and heteroskedasticity tests are 
negative, which means that the obtained estimators are 
not unbiased, and this can be solved by processing the 
HAC (Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent 
Standard Errors), and White and HET (Kelejian & Prucha, 
2010) estimations to deal with heteroskedasticity.
The GMM is one of the most modern methodologies 
to estimate parameters. It is based on estimating probabil-
ity distribution parameters by calculating possible distri-
bution values with which a better fit of the moments is 
obtained when data are analyzed. There are four moments 
in a normal distribution: mean, standard deviation, asym-
metry and kurtosis. The data distribution might not be 
exactly the same as those in the data distribution, but the 
estimation is based on obtaining the moments of a distri-
bution that most closely resembles the real distribution.
From a practical point of view, the GMM allows data 
processing problems to be solved which, as previously men-
tioned, are considered with the ML method as calculations 
that are much more complex (Kelejian & Prucha, 1999).
The estimation process to estimate parameters is as follows:
 – First the model estimation is obtained by either MCO 
or GS2SLS (if there are any endogenous variables) to 
thus obtain residuals, u. Using the initial regression 
model (3) and the errors vector (4), residuals u and 
their spatial lags λ are included in the equations of 
moments (5), and an initial estimation is obtained.
m = g – G 2
λ 
  λ 
 = 0. (8)
 – Second, the initial estimations, using the estimations 
of ,λ  which we call 1 ,λ  are employed in a spatially 
weighted least-squared equation to obtain some new 𝛽 
parameters. The technical details of this methodology 
are provided in detail in Kelejian and Prucha (2010).
To apply HAC, a Kernel weights matrix is required.
3. Results
Moran’s I Index for the dwelling’s appraisal value by apply-
ing the different spatial weight is offered in Table 2.
Table 2. Moran’s I Index for the different weights matrices5
Summary of the results
Criterion Matrix1 Moran’s I
Distance MIN_DIST 0.008
Distance DIST_1000 0.465
Distance DIST_500 0.562
Contiguity ADJ_1 0.665
Contiguity ADJ_2 0.594
Contiguity ADJ_30 –0.094
K – nearest neighbors KNN6 0.685
K – nearest neighbors KNN10 0.662
K – nearest neighbors KNN30 0.618
As we can see, the weights matrix of distances with 
contiguity order 1 (Queen) gives good results (I = 0.665), 
but the best results are given for the neighborhood crite-
rion (particularly knn with 6 neighbors) (I = 0.685).
The criterion that gives the worst results is distance be-
cause if we consider the minimum distance (so that all the 
dwellings have at least one neighbor), Moran’s I shows an 
almost null spatial autocorrelation (I = 0.008) (bimodal dis-
tribution is generated). The autocorrelation increases when 
we take shorter distances (which is logical), but “isles” ap-
pear in the weights and make the analysis complicated. 
Moreover, but no less important, this kind of weights means 
using an enormous amount of computing resources given 
the high matrix nxn density, and calculations become ex-
tremely complicated with roughly 5000 data. Anselin and 
Rey (2014) point out that calculation problems start arising 
with several thousands of data for both SLM and SEM.
For all these reasons, the distance weights matrix was 
ruled out, and the weights matrix with KNN6, 6 nearest 
neighbors and contiguity degree 1 were selected. However, 
this implies a problem that stems from the weights ma-
trix’s lack of symmetry for KNN6.
Table 3 includes the indicators of the hedonic models 
estimated by OLS by taking the property’s appraisal value 
as the dependent variable (in its logarithmic form). Ta-
ble 4 shows the spatial dependence diagnostics.
Table 3. Test of multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, non 
normality and spatial dependence in OLS
β sign
Autocorrelation Durbin-Watson 1.8079
Normality Jarque-Bera 0.000
Heteroskedasticity Breusch-Pagan test 0.000
5 MIN_DIST refers to the minimum distance so that all the ob-
servations have a neighbor, which is 12.9 km. DIST_1000 and 
DIST_500 respectively refer to 1000 and 500 meters. ADJ_1 
denotes contiguity degree 1 (all the nearest flats), ADJ_2 and 
ADJ_30 respectively represent contiguity degree 2 and 30 (all 
flats up to proximity degree k, so that the number of neighbors 
varies depending on proximity); KNN6, KNN10 and KNN30 
respectively refer to only 6,10 and 30 nearest neighbors.
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All the tests indicate that spatial dependence exists.
Figure 2 shows the Local Indicators of Spatial Associa-
tion of the OLS standard errors, geographically distributed 
in census sections (secciones censales). High residual val-
ues are located around the city of Valencia (HH values), 
while Low residuals clusters are fewer and located inside 
the province.
Table 4. Spatial dependence diagnostics
WEIGHTS
KNN6 Contiguity ADJ_1
TEST MI/DF VALUE n.c. MI/DF VALUE n.c.
Moran’s I (error) 0.26 62.6803 *** 0,24 54.3513 ***
LM (lag) 1 2667.7152 *** 1 2621.9507 ***
Robust LM (lag) 1 706.0637 *** 1 779.6412 ***
LM (error) 1 3889.1747 *** 1 2928.3063 ***
Robust LM (error) 1 1927.5232 *** 1 1085.9968 ***
LM (SARMA) 2 4595.2384 *** 2 3707.9475 ***
*** The test shows that spatial dependence exists at the 99% significance level.
Figure 2. LISA (Local Indicators of Spatial Association) OLS Std_Residuals
A specification of the OLS hedonic model is provided 
in Table 5, along with the spatial models using the conti-
guity degree 1 weights matrices estimated by ML. In them 
the dependent variable is the value that the property takes 
in its logarithmic form. Appraisal company S14 is used as 
a witness in all the analyses.
Table 5. Model OLS, models SLM and SEM estimated by ML and model SLM-SEM estimated by  
the GMM with the contiguity degree 1 matrices
Contiguity_1 Coefficients
Variables OLS SLM SEM SLM+SEM (GMM)
Constant 6.1*** (0) 3.34*** (0) 5.65*** (0) 3.32*** (0)
LN_ANT_C 0.16*** (0) 0.17*** (0) 0.2*** (0) 0.18*** (0)
LN_ANT_C_2 –0.04*** (0) –0.04*** (0) –0.05*** (0) –0.05*** (0)
LN_SADO –0.36*** (0) –0.21*** (0.04) 0.17** (0.1) –0.03 (0.86)
LN_SADO_2 0.14*** (0) 0.12*** (0) 0.08*** (0) 0.1*** (0)
COST 0.66*** (0) 0.58*** (0) 0.54*** (0) 0.56*** (0)
NUDO 0.08*** (0) 0.07*** (0) 0.07*** (0) 0.07*** (0)
CALI –0.28*** (0) –0.23*** (0) –0.22*** (0) –0.22*** (0)
CONS –0.19*** (0) –0.19*** (0) –0.19*** (0) –0.19*** (0)
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Contiguity_1 Coefficients
Variables OLS SLM SEM SLM+SEM (GMM)
MCTC –0.01*** (0) –0.01*** (0) –0.01*** (0) –0.01*** (0)
MCTD 0.02*** (0) 0.02*** (0) 0.02*** (0) 0.02*** (0)
NPLA 0.02*** (0) 0.01*** (0) 0.01*** (0.03) 0.01*** (0.04)
IZVE 0.05*** (0) 0.02*** (0.05) 0.03*** (0) 0.02*** (0.05)
IPIS 0.08*** (0) 0.04*** (0) 0.05*** (0) 0.04*** (0)
ICAL 0.04*** (0) 0.04*** (0) 0.04*** (0) 0.04*** (0)
IAIR 0.04*** (0) 0.05*** (0) 0.04*** (0) 0.04*** (0)
IASC 0.2*** (0) 0.17*** (0) 0.18*** (0) 0.17*** (0)
IECO 0.02*** (0) 0.02*** (0) 0.02*** (0) 0.02*** (0)
PEXN –0.36*** (0) 0 (0.95) –0.27*** (0) 0 (0.97)
PEXE –0.76*** (0) –0.53*** (0) –0.68*** (0) –0.54*** (0)
NEALT 0.5*** (0) 0.34*** (0) 0.48*** (0) 0.36*** (0)
VVAC –0.35*** (0) –0.26*** (0) –0.34*** (0) –0.27*** (0)
HAVI –0.35*** (0) –0.28*** (0) –0.34*** (0) –0.29*** (0)
ALQ 1.75*** (0) 1.25*** (0) 1.54*** (0) 1.27*** (0)
C1 0.63*** (0) 0.36*** (0) 0.66*** (0) 0.39*** (0)
C2 0.27*** (0) 0.17*** (0) 0.3*** (0) 0.19*** (0)
P1 0.38*** (0) 0.32*** (0) 0.36*** (0) 0.33*** (0)
P2 0.2*** (0) 0.17*** (0) 0.2*** (0) 0.18*** (0)
D1_REN 0.1*** (0) 0.09*** (0) 0.09*** (0) 0.09*** (0)
D2_REN 0.05*** (0) 0.04*** (0) 0.05*** (0) 0.04*** (0)
S01 0.38*** (0) 0.32*** (0) 0.25*** (0) 0.28*** (0)
S07 –0.23*** (0) –0.2*** (0) –0.22*** (0) –0.21*** (0)
S08 –0.26*** (0) –0.23*** (0) –0.22*** (0) –0.22*** (0)
S09 –0.03 (0.83) –0.01 (0.95) –0.04 (0.78) –0.02 (0.66)
S10 0.09*** (0) 0.09*** (0) 0.07*** (0) 0.08*** (0)
S11 –0.31*** (0) –0.28*** (0) –0.28*** (0) –0.28*** (0)
S12 –0.29*** (0) –0.26*** (0) –0.28*** (0) –0.27*** (0)
S15 –0.22*** (0) –0.21*** (0) –0.23*** (0) –0.22*** (0)
S16 –0.25*** (0) –0.23*** (0) –0.23*** (0) –0.23*** (0)
S17 –0.15*** (0) –0.13*** (0) –0.14*** (0) –0.13*** (0)
S18 –0.13*** (0) –0.11*** (0) –0.12*** (0) –0.11*** (0)
S20 –0.17*** (0) –0.14*** (0) –0.14*** (0) –0.13*** (0)
S23 –0.17*** (0) –0.15*** (0) –0.16*** (0) –0.15*** (0)
S25 –0.39*** (0) –0.35*** (0) –0.35*** (0) –0.35*** (0)
S26 –0.19*** (0) –0.17*** (0) –0.18*** (0) –0.18*** (0)
S27 –0.21*** (0) –0.21*** (0) –0.23*** (0) –0.23*** (0)
S28 –0.24*** (0) –0.21*** (0) –0.21*** (0) –0.21*** (0)
S29 –0.17*** (0) –0.17*** (0) –0.18*** (0) –0.18*** (0)
S30 –0.24*** (0) –0.22*** (0) –0.24*** (0) –0.23*** (0)
S31 –0.17*** (0) –0.14*** (0) –0.15*** (0) –0.14*** (0)
SRES –0.2*** (0) –0.19*** (0) –0.21*** (0) –0.2*** (0)
ρ 0 (0) 0.27*** (0) 0 (0) 0.24*** (0)
λ 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.51*** (0) 0.25*** (0)
R2 adjusted 0.8392 0.8614 0.8669 0.8605
AIC 201.55 –2052.25 –2088.44
Level of significance**95%; * 90%. P-value in parentheses.
End of Table 5
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The spatial models that use the contiguity degree 1 
weights matrices estimated by the GMM, and the models 
with the spatial K-nearest neighbors weights matrix, are 
employed, with a spatial pseudo R2 between 0.8343 and 
0.86673 and very similar results.
The best model is SEM, obtained by ML and the con-
tiguity weights because it presents the highest adjusted R2 
(0.8669) and the lowest AIC (–2088.44).
In the analyzed models, all the hedonic variables are al-
ways significant, except for the non-European population 
(PEXN), which, in some cases, does not even reach 90%.6
6 In this case we take S25 as the company to compare with 
because its presents a lower regression coefficient, while the 
other coefficients are > 0.
Moreover in all the models, the coefficients of the vari-
ables, except for variable PEXN, are similar and take the 
same sign.
Significant differences were obtained in all the models 
among the appraisal companies (save S09) in relation to 
witness company S14.
Table 6 contains the coefficients for all the companies, 
obtained according to the SEM model estimated by ML 
with the contiguity degree 1 weight matrix.
As we can see, the coefficients that correspond to the 
companies show statistically significant differences, and in 
relation to that with a lower coefficient (S25), they range 
between +83% of the valuation and +0%. The mean dif-
ference is 22%.
One third of companies (8 of 22) exceed the over-
valuation mean.
When grouping into over-valuation intervals (<10%; 
from 10% to 25%; from 25% to 50% and >50%), we ob-
serve that 64% of companies value between 10% and 25% 
more than the company selected to make the comparison 
does (see Figure 3).
Table  7 shows how the companies that are grouped 
into four size groups are distributed, according to the 
mean over-valuation level. Group 4 represents the smallest 
companies and groups 10 companies, whose mean over-
valuation is 15%. The other groups comprise seven com-
Table 6. Coefficients of the appraisers’ variables retransformed 
from the SEM model by ML
Company
Original 
coefficients 
jγ
Retransformed 
coefficients
 1* 1je γ −
N.S
S01 0.60 0.83 ***
S07 0.13 0.14 ***
S08 0.13 0.14 ***
S10 0.42 0.52 ***
S11 0.07 0.07 ***
S12 0.07 0.07 ***
S14 0.35 1.42 ***
S15 0.12 0.13 ***
S16 0.12 0.24 ***
S17 0.21 0.26 ***
S18 0.23 0.23 ***
S20 0.21 0.21 ***
S23 0.19 0.00 ***
S256 0.00 0.00 ***
S26 0.17 0.18 ***
S27 0.12 0.12 ***
S28 0.14 0.15 ***
S29 0.17 0.19 ***
S30 0.12 0.12 ***
S31 0.20 0.22 ***
SRES 0.14 0.15 ***
Table 7. Distribution of appraisal companies according to number of appraisals made,  
overappraisals and SEM model coefficients
Over-valuation
Company size <10%(low)
10–25%
(moderate)
25–50%
(high)
>50% (very 
high) Mean
SEM model 
coeff.
No. 
companies
1 large (> 1250 appraisals) 14.3% 57.1% 28.6% 19% 0.52% (0.25) 7
2 medium (500–1250 appraisals) 28.6% 71.4% 13% 0.0% ***(0) 7
3 small (100–500 appraisals) 57.1% 14.3% 28.6% 35% 8.91% ***(0) 7
4 micro (< 100 appraisals) 100.0% 15% –1.02% (0.56) 10
Total 14% 64% 14% 9% 100%
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Figure 3. Histogram of the % of companies according to over-
valuation levels
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panies each. In all cases, the most frequent over-valuation 
levels are moderate, except for group 3 (small companies) 
with 43% which implies high or very high over-valuation 
levels; 28.6% of large companies obtain high over-valua-
tion levels (25–50%).
The mean over-valuation level of each group is 19% for 
large-sized companies, 13% for medium-sized ones, 35% 
for small-sized ones and 15% for micro-companies. These 
results are in line with that pointed out and reveal that the 
highest over-valuation levels go to small-sized companies 
(defined as those that make 100–500 appraisals).
4. Discussion
The contribution to the academic literature lies precise-
ly in this being the first work to jointly analyze the data 
of all the valuations made for financing purposes over a 
1-year period and in a given region. To date all the other 
works conducted in Spain have been related with a single 
appraisal company (García & Raya, 2011) or with a real-
estate intermediary (Akin et al., 2014; Montalvo & Raya, 
2017), which meant that making comparisons among 
them was impossible. What this suggests is that when the 
data of valuations from a single information source are 
analyzed, they can provide biased results that derive from 
either human judgment or the appraiser’s guidelines.
In line with other works (Affuso et al., 2017; Brasing-
ton, 2004; Chegut et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2015), spatial 
models provide better results than hedonic models. None-
theless, the differences between them are small. All the 
coefficients of the variables provide coherent results, but 
some results need explaining.
When presenting the coefficients of a higher magni-
tude to determine the property’s appraisal value, the most 
relevant variables are basically those that affect the socio-
economic setting; European foreign population, level of 
education, empty dwellings, mean number of tenants and 
rented dwellings in the area. This result differs to the view 
of Aspachs-Bracons and Rabanal (2010), who consider 
that one of the main factors that could be behind the 
peak observed in residential properties in Spain is demo-
graphic factors related with immigration and changes in 
the composition of homes. According to our study, the 
non European foreign population was not significant or 
gave a negative coefficient in the models. Save some very 
delimited areas (as in the city of Valencia), this might be 
due to this population being spread out all over the prov-
ince, except in coastline areas where it does not appear. 
Conversely, the European foreign population has a nega-
tive coefficient. This is because the higher concentrations 
of European populations are non-Schengen nationalities, 
whose general profile is a medium-low level. These coef-
ficients imply that in the cases with a higher concentration 
of foreigners, relative prices are lower in relation to the 
setting. However in some isolated areas, concentrations of 
different European populations to the previous one can be 
found (particularly the English), which would have a dif-
ferent effect, but the relative weight in the province is low-
er. Thus the regressors show an inverse relation to price.
We have ratified the importance of location in the 
hedonic regression, as demonstrated by García and Raya 
(2011), although it has been measured differently through 
education in a given area. We find that a shorter distance 
to the coastline means a higher purchase-sale price for res-
idential properties. In our study the prices with a shorter 
distance of 100 meters from a beach obtain 20% higher 
prices than those obtained for distances between 100 
meters and 2 km, but only for the location factor, which 
agrees with the retransformed coefficients difference7.
Regarding distance to city center, we also observe that 
more centrally located dwellings tend to be more expen-
sive than those at a longer distance to the center. This re-
sult coincides with Chasco and Le Gallo (2013), who ob-
tained statistically significant results for proximity to the 
main axes, distance to CBD and for distance to large parks 
in order to analyze the impact of pollution and noise on 
the purchase-sale price of dwellings in the city of Madrid. 
However, their study referred only to central Madrid, and 
the idiosyncrasy of Madrid also differs to Valencia. The 
value of a residential property being located first in line 
to the beach is also almost twice the price of those located 
at a further distance to these areas. Indeed, in the selected 
model, regressors give a value of 0.66 and 0.34 in the city 
center and location first in line to the beach, versus 0.30 
and 0.18 for locations not in the city center and second in 
line to the beach.
Just as Salon et al. (2014) found in China, the exist-
ence of a tram service in the towns surrounding the city 
influences the price of dwellings. The price of the housing 
located at a distance from a tram stop shorter than 1 km 
increases by 10%, while those located less than 2 km from 
a tram stop increase by 5% compared to other dwellings 
located in towns of the same province.
This led us to establish that location is a much more 
important variable when it comes to valuing a dwelling 
than its intrinsic characteristics, at least for dwellings with 
similar basic characteristics. Indeed some characteristic 
variables of dwellings influence the value less. The regres-
sors of these variables take values of 0.18 if the build-
ing has an elevator, 0.04 if there is air conditioning and, 
therefore, influence the value less than location factors. 
The coefficient is negative with covered terraces. This is 
apparently due to a covered terrace normally being val-
ued as more usable surface area because a covered terrace 
surface area is calculated at 50% as the dwelling having 
more surface area. Thus a negative coefficient is obtained 
by valuing this surface area to a lesser extent than other 
surface areas. Number of bathrooms is not significant, 
which is possibly due to its correlation with the dwelling’s 
surface area, and the same applies to number of parking 
places as most dwellings (97%) report none.
7  P1 = 0,34 and P2 = 0.18. If we retransform the coefficients, 
then P1 = e0,34 and P2 = e0,18
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Nor does the legal purpose of appraisals have a strong 
influence. Regarding appraisals in accordance with Min-
isterial Order ECO/805/2003 (78% of evaluations were 
for mortgages), this dummy variable coefficient is posi-
tive, but only contributes 2.8% to the property’s value. This 
result might be a surprising one as such valuations should 
be more conservative. Nonetheless, it can be interpreted 
that, on the one hand, the difference that this coefficient 
gives is limited (2.8% of the property’s value) and, on the 
other hand, as these appraisals are for banking purposes, 
there is a tendency for more pressure from both custom-
ers and banks.
Regarding the main aspect of this study, we verified 
the influence of appraisal companies on values. Significant 
differences among them are found, which can be as much 
as 83% of the value depending on which company valued 
it. Of all the analyzed companies, 64% over-value between 
10% and 25% compared  to the company that gives the 
lowest values. The data reveal that the higher over-valu-
ation levels are shown for small-sized companies (which 
make 100–500 valuations/year), where almost half the 
companies obtain high or very high over-valuation levels. 
No medium-sized or micro-company obtains high over-
valuation levels, while two companies in the large-sized 
group (28.6%) present high over-valuation levels.
The mean over-valuation in small-sized companies is 
higher, with 35% versus a mean of 22%, which reinforces 
what has been pointed out.
These study findings may be an empirical contribution 
to this literature, which has been primarily survey- and 
experiment-based. It would be necessary to consider the 
possibility that the model could be miscalibrated, but we 
think this is not the case because the results of the ob-
tained models are all in line in magnitude and sign terms. 
Besides, the selected model, which gave the best fit, gen-
erally shows some parameter values that are intermediate 
compared to those of the other models.
Moreover, the population was separated into several 
divisions to determine if differences among the param-
eters appeared. The results obtained from the cross vali-
dation show that the parameter values were similar and, 
thus, no model miscalibration problems appeared.
Furthermore to verify these results, a new SEM model 
was performed by substituting the appraisal companies’ 
dummy variables for four dummy variables depending on 
the size of the company. The results of this new model 
were similar to the SEM model included in Table 5, but 
with an adjusted R2 below 0.84 and an AIC above 157.07. 
Thus the initial analysis was left with the appraisal com-
panies’ dummy variables.
Nonetheless Table  7 includes the coefficients of the 
SEM model with the sizes variables. The higher coefficient, 
0.0891, refers to small companies (significance level above 
99%). The very small companies coefficient is –0.0102, and 
the Bigger companies one is 0.0052. Medium companies 
are the benchmark dummy variable.
Although the measure is not comparable, these results 
agree with those obtained in other works conducted in 
Spain (García Montalvo, 2009; Akin et al., 2014), which 
confirms that increased appraisals exist for purchase-sale 
values of around 29%.
Nonetheless, it is worth stressing that this study dif-
fers from those by Chinloy et  al. (1997) and Cho and 
Megbolugbe (1996), which compared property valua-
tions with purchase-sale prices. In our case, the obtained 
over-valuation levels are not a measure of a higher value 
in absolute values over the “real” market value because, 
due to different purposes or other circumstances, the basis 
of the comparison can be undervalued. Although we are 
unaware if a transaction has taken place and, if so, its final 
price, a difference of up to 83% indicates a high degree 
of over-appraisal. We found that, although the results do 
not point out that over-appraising is a generalized prac-
tice, some appraisal companies systematically maintain 
a higher level for their valuations than others. Montalvo 
and Raya (2017) argue that the manipulation of loan to 
appraisal values, due to the ownership of appraisal com-
panies by financial institutions, has been a determining 
cause of the challenges that the Spanish banking system 
has faced in recent years. Moreover in Spain, however, 
over-appraisal was an important driver of the housing 
bubble as it was used to open the market for borrowers 
with financial constraints. This fact has major implications 
for macroeconomic policies given the marked interrela-
tions between financial markets and real-estate agencies 
because increasing valuations allow the amount of credit 
to be increased per financed dwelling owing to the 80% 
LTV ratio, which is currently favoured by very low rates. 
Thus Montalvo and Raya (2017) propose the notion that 
recovering the effectiveness of the LTV is to link the value 
used for the LTV ratio to the price, as reflected on the title 
kept at the Property Registry.
Nonetheless, it is worth stressing that this study dif-
fers from those by Chinloy et  al. (1997) and Cho and 
Megbolugbe (1996), which compared property valuations 
with purchase-sale prices. In our case, the obtained over-
valuation levels are not a measure of a higher value in ab-
solute values over the “real” market value because, due to 
different purposes or other circumstances, the basis of the 
comparison can be undervalued.
Conclusions
The validity of spatial models to value dwellings for mort-
gage purposes has been demonstrated for the province of 
Valencia. The sample should be extended to other regions 
in Spain and for other years in order to validate the ob-
tained results. Both the characteristics of dwellings and 
socio-economic and location factors influence mortgage 
values. Although it has not been possible to determine 
the differences with the purchase-sale value given the na-
ture of the analyzed data, and also due to the fact that 
purchase-sale data are missing, it has been verified that 
the appraisal value differs depending on the company that 
makes the appraisal. It has been shown that company size 
somewhat influences values as small-sized ones present 
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higher over-valuation levels, which confirms the weak sit-
uation they are in. Another analysis is necessary to be able 
to conclude a possible over-valuation incentive. Perhaps it 
is a matter of the smaller that companies are, the less they 
withstand pressure from customers and stakeholders to 
over-value. Perhaps company size grows if they give way 
to these pressures. If so, subordinating customers could 
mean unstable business for companies, which is not gen-
erally the case in practice.
So it is evident that other factors other than company 
size exist, such as interacting with other stakeholders, 
societal organization and internal control, or even the 
company’s idiosyncrasy, which also influences if over-
valuations exist. All this implies a high risk in mortgage 
securities, which can put the survival of banks at risk. 
Therefore, as stated by Lacour-Little and Malpezzi (2003), 
it is necessary to develop quality appraisal measures now 
more than ever while mortgage credits are rising because 
the Spanish economy is reactivating.
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